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STATE CAPTURE AND CONTROLLING OWNERS OF FIRMS 
 
 
Abstract: 
How does the effect “state capture” depend the identity of the captor? We use a dataset 
on preferential treatment of selected firms by regional legislature and regulatory agencies 
in transitional Russia to show that the most effective and the least benign captors are 
“federal oligarchs” i.e., the firms within groups that have representation in more than two 
regions. Preferential treatments given to the federal oligarchs bring them higher than 
average benefits in terms of performance boost. Other firms in the region suffer more 
from capture by the federal oligarchs than when capture is carried out by other firms. In 
contrast, firms that are controlled by large regional owners do not have a strong effect of 
preferential treatments on either their own performance or performance of other regional 
firms.  
 
 
JEL classification: P26, P27, D71, D72 
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I. Introduction 
Industrial concentration has an important impact on relationship between 
governments and firms (see, for instance, Grossman and Helpman, 1994 and 1995; 
Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer, 2003; Sonin, 2003 and 2004). In particular, when few 
private agents have control over a large share of cash flows or employment, it is easier 
for these agents to lobby, bribe or intimidate government agents in order to influence 
operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions. Slinko, Yakovlev, and 
Zhuravskaya (2004) use data on preferential treatments to the largest regional firms in 
legislation of Russian Federation Subjects to show that 1) regional legislature has been 
subverted by vested interests in many Russian regions; 2) political influence generates 
substantial gains to firms-captors; and 3) capture has adverse affect on performance of 
regional firms that do not exercise political influence. Slinko et al. analyze regional 
capture without making distinction among firms that have different controlling owners. It 
is possible, however, that the identity of the controlling owner affects both the propensity 
to capture government institutions and the effects of this capture. In this paper, we 
address the question of whether and how regional-level institutional subversion is 
affected by the identity of the controlling owner. We compare incidences of legislative 
preferential treatment and effects of preferential treatments for firms with dispersed 
ownership, firms that are controlled by federal oligarchs (i.e., individuals that have 
control over large firms in many different regions), regional private investors (private 
agents that control firms in two or fewer regions), foreign investors, the federal 
government, and regional governments. There has been some survey evidence (see, for 
instance, Frye, 2003), that in Russia state-owned firms are engaged in state capture as 
much as private firms. A possible explanation for this is that state does not have a close 
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control over state-owned firms; instead managers appropriate both control and cash flows 
of these firms for their private benefit. In this case, one should not observe a substantial 
difference between behavior of state-owned firms and firms with private ownership vis-à-
vis government institutions since both types of firms are essentially controlled by private 
parties. There has not been any research, so far, on how state capture is affected by the 
scope of economic interests of controlling owners: in a large federation, such as Russia, 
one would expect firms that are under control of agents with federal interests to behave 
differently from firms that are controlled by agents that have only narrow regional 
interests. On the one hand, capture by regional interests (unlike capture by federal 
interests) would not internalize externalities of regulatory policies to neighboring 
jurisdictions, i.e., lowering tax rates or erecting inter-regional trade barriers in a particular 
region may serve interests of the largest regional enterprises but impose costs on firms in 
other regions (Tanzi, 1996; Besley and Coate, 2003; Cai and Treisman, 2003). On the 
other hand, capture by federal interests (unlike capture by regional interests) may have 
larger negative effect on performance of other firms in the same region because federal 
interests have relatively small concern about political incentives of regional governments 
compared to the regional interests who most probably have lower bargaining power vis-à-
vis regional authorities. In this paper, we test these hypotheses. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data. Section III presents the 
identities of controlling owners of firms that get treated preferentially. Section IV 
addresses the question of how the effect of capture on performance of captors is affected 
by the type of controlling owner of the firm. Section V sheds light on the question of how 
the effect of state capture on firms that are not politically connected is affected by the 
type of captor’s owner. Section VI concludes. 
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II. Data  
The analysis presented here is based on the data from intersection of two data 
sets: 1) the data on preferential treatment of large firms by regional legislation (Slinko, 
Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya, 2004) and 2) data on controlling owners of firms from the 
World Bank data set “Who owns Russia” collected for the Russia Country Economic 
Memorandum (World Bank, 2004). 
The sample consists of 301 enterprises in 67 regions of the Russian Federation. 
Not all firms in the sample have the necessary for the analysis data; therefore, regressions 
usually have fewer firms. Distributions of firms by region and industry are presented in 
tables 1 and 2. Dynamics of the average number of preferential treatments per firm is 
presented in Figure 1. 
We use panel data for preferential treatments between 1996 and 2000 and cross-
section ownership data for 2003. In the analysis, we run cross-section (between-effects) 
regressions on averages over these five years. Since the ownership data is for 2003, 
analysis is possible only under the assumption that ownership has not changed since 
1996. This is most probably a wrong assumption and, therefore, results should be 
interpreted with a lot of caution. Data limitations, however, do not allow us to overcome 
this problem. Moreover, the sample of 301 firms is very small, which in many cases 
creates another unsolvable methodological problem: in regressions that look at 
relationship of capture and performance – we cannot find instruments powerful enough to 
make any substantiated claims about causality. 
III. Who receives preferential treatments? 
The first question that we address is how different characteristics of the ultimate 
controlling owner of a firm affect the firm’s likelihood to get preferential treatments in 
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the regional legislation. We define preferential treatments as the following benefits 
granted to a particular firm by the regional legislation: tax breaks, investment credits, 
subsidies, subsidized loans and loans with a regional budget guarantee, official delays in 
tax payments, subsidized licensing, state property given away for free, or creation of a 
“Special Open Economic Zone” on the firm’s territory. 
We define full control by 50% or higher ownership stake.1 The ultimate 
controlling owner is defined as the controlling owner that is not fully controlled by any 
other firm or individual. One question that we are interested in is how the size of the 
group to which a firm belongs influences frequency of preferential treatments for this 
firm. The size of the group is defined by the total number of enterprises in the group.2 
Table 3 reports plain averages for firm’s number of preferential treatments and their share 
as a function of the size of the group in which this firm is included. The share (as well as 
the number) of preferential treatments increases with the size of the group under the 
control of the ultimate controlling owner of the firm. Regression results presented below 
confirm this result. 
The second question that we address is whether full control over other firms 
brings better possibilities to obtain political influence. Table 4 presents means of the 
shares of preferential treatments in firms that are the ultimate controlling owner or a 
controlling owner (in the middle of the control pyramid) in comparison to preferential 
treatment shares in other firms. Firms that control other firms have higher shares of 
preferential treatments. Regression results presented below confirm this result. 
                                                 
1 There is a caveat: small number of enterprises has ownership stakes divided 50/50, in this case, the 
controlling party was determined by a random draw. Deleting these enterprises from the sample does not 
affect the results. 
2 If the size of the group is measured by the total employment of the group, there are no significant results. 
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The third question that we address in this section is how the presence of controlling 
owner and the identity of the ultimate controlling owner affect incidences of regional 
legislative preferential treatments. Each firm in the sample is categorized in to one of the 
following types according its ultimate controlling owner: 
- Controlled by federal private oligarch, if firm’s ultimate controlling owner is a non-
state firm or individual that has full control over enterprises in more than two regions; 
- Controlled by regional private owner, if ultimate controlling owner is a non-state 
firm or individual that has full control over a group of firms that are located in no more 
than two regions or has control over just one regional enterprise; 
- Controlled by foreign investor, if a foreign investor that has ultimate full control; 
- Controlled by the federal government, if ultimate control is in hands of federal 
ministries, other government agencies, or federally owned-firms such as Gazprom, RAO 
UES, Rosneft, Transneft, and Transnefteproduct; 
- Controlled by regional government, if firm’s ultimate controlling owner is the 
regional government;  
- Has dispersed ownership, if there is no party that has full control over the firm. 
Table 5 presents means for shares and numbers of preferential treatments by type of 
firms’ ultimate controlling owner. The average size of firm’s employment and firm’s 
group are provided in the table because they have an independent direct effect on 
likelihood of getting preferential treatments. Thus, looking at plain group averages of 
preferential treatments is misleading. Results come from regression analysis presented 
below. 
A number of federal private oligarchs demonstrated a priory high political 
influence in the middle of 1990s when they managed to get access to privatization 
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through loans-for-shares deals with the federal government. We can check whether these 
oligarchs retained their political influence later on. Table 7 presents means for the share 
of preferential treatments received by firms that are a part of the group that engaged in 
loans-for-shares deals. Indeed, these firms have significantly higher share of preferential 
treatments than other firms or than the other federal oligarchs. Regression analysis 
presented below confirms this result. 
In order to investigate formally what kinds of firms receive preferential 
treatments, we run between-effects OLS regressions with the following basic 
specification:  
ffftff groupinfirmsLogemploymentLogContrDummyPTs εααα +++= )___(#)(_ 321 0 . (1) 
The average share of firm’s preferential treatments received by a particular firm   
between 1996 and 2000 (taken among their five largest recipients), PTs , is regressed on 
dummies that indicate type of the controlling owner of the firm, , 
controlling for the initial employment level, , and the size of the group 
to which the firm belongs, . We take the share of preferential 
treatments rather than their number because we are measuring institutional subversion 
that presumes unequal treatment of similar firms by legislation.
ContrDummy _
)(employmentLog
)___(# groupinfirmsLog
3 Henceforth, subscript f 
identifies firms; subscript  denotes the initial year (i.e., 1994); upper bars denote 
averages over 1996 and 2000. Thus, α
0t
1  reflects the average difference in the shares of 
preferential treatments received by the firms with a certain controlling owner and other 
firms in the sample and α3  indicates the effect of the size of the group. Regression results 
are provided in table 7. 
                                                 
3 An extensive discussion of this point is given in Slinko et al., 2003. Shares of preferential treatments are 
taken among their five largest recipients to make the denominator comparable across regions. 
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 We find that, ceteris paribus, 1) the size of the group that is under the full control 
by the ultimate controlling owner of a particular firm has positive significant effect on the 
likelihood that this firm gets preferential treatments; 2) if a firm is the ultimate 
controlling owner of a group or just has control over another firm, it is significantly more 
likely to get treated preferentially than other firms; 3) firms ultimately controlled by a 
regional private owner and foreign direct investor are significantly more likely to get 
preferential treatments compared to all other firms; 4) firms controlled by a federal 
private oligarch are less likely to receive regional preferential treatments compared to all 
other firms; 5) if a firm is a part of group that participated in loans-for-shares deals, it is 
more likely to get treated preferentially; 6) if a firm has dispersed owners and no-one has 
controlling stake, it is significantly less likely to receive preferential treatments than all 
other firms except federal oligarchs. The economic significance of these is as follows: the 
ultimate controlling owner of a group and firms controlled by foreigners on average 
receive twice as many preferential treatments as the average firm in the sample; firms 
with regional private owners are 1.3 times more likely to get treated preferentially than 
the average firm; firms in groups that engaged in loans-for-shares privatization are 1.2 
times more likely to get preferential treatments; whereas firms controlled by federal 
private oligarchs receive 30% fewer preferential treatments than the average firm in the 
sample. 
IV. Does the relationship between preferential treatments and performance differ 
by type of controlling owner?  
Slinko et al. (2004) show that preferential treatments generate substantial gains to 
firms both in the long and the short run.  Firms that receive preferential treatments exhibit 
faster growth in sales, market share, profitability, employment, and capital compared to 
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their counterparts who are not politically connected. In addition, these firms have better 
bargaining position vis-à-vis their suppliers, employees, and the government – that allows 
them to maintain higher than average growth of arrears to these parties. Here we 
investigate whether the effect of capture on captors’ performance depends on the 
ownership type of captor firms. 
In order to investigate how the relationship between preferential treatments and 
performance of captor firms differs by type of controlling owner, we use the following 
basic OLS between-effects specification:  
ffftff
f
ffff PTCyContrDummyPTSnPTSPTSContrDummyy εααααα +++++−•−= ∑ 54321 0_))/)(()_1(
(2) 
y  stands for the following indicators of firms’ performance: net-of-mean-industry log 
values of sales, employment, fixed assets, labor productivity, profit, arrears to suppliers, 
wage arrears, arrears to budget. These indicators of performance are regressed on the 
average share of preferential treatments (PTS) and its interaction with dummy indicating 
firms that are not of a particular controlling owner’s type.4 We control for the initial 
performance (yt0), the direct effect of controlling owner type on performance 
(Dummy_Contr), and the scale of regional institutional subversion measured by the 
average preferential treatment concentration (PTC). We use the concentration of 
preferential treatments across regions as a proxy for unequal treatment of similar firms by 
rules and institutions. As a measure of concentration, we take a sum of squared shares of 
the numbers of preferential treatments (the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index).5 Interpretation 
of coefficients in this case is as follows: α1 equals to the difference in effects of an 
                                                 
4 The across-firms average share of preferential treatments is subtracted from the firm’s share of 
preferential treatment to make interpretation of coefficient α3 easier. 
5 The effect of lobbying on firms-lobbyists may differ in high and low capture environments (Hellman, 
Jones, and Kaufmann, 2004). A more detailed description of PTC variable is given in Slinko et al., 2003. 
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increase in preferential treatment share on performance for firms with the particular 
controlling owner (such that =1) and for the other firms in the sample; αContrDummy _ 2 is 
the effect of an increase in preferential treatment share on performance of firms with the 
particular controlling owner; and α3 is the direct effect of controlling owner type on 
performance evaluated at the mean value of PTS. We also report the value of point 
estimates of α2  and their standard errors from the adjacent regressions that show the 
effect of an increase in preferential treatment share on performance of firms that do not 
have that particular controlling owner type. 
 The sample used here, unfortunately, is too small and does not allow us to find 
appropriate instruments for the share of preferential treatments (that can be affected by 
performance). Thus, we are unable to draw any conclusions about the direction of 
causality in relationship between performance of firms and preferential treatments by 
owner type. All references to causal relationships are merely conjectures rather then 
conclusions. The full set of regression results is presented in Table A1 in Appendix.
The results are as follows: When the controlling owner of a firm is a federal 
oligarch, the political influence brings tangible benefits in terms of performance and 
bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers, employees and government: an increase in 
preferential treatment share positively significantly increases growth in profitability, 
sales, fixed capital, and regional market share as well as arrears to workers, suppliers, and 
the budget. These results are consistent with the average effect of preferential treatments 
estimated by instrumental variables regressions on the full sample in Slinko et al. 2004. 
Moreover, the share of preferential treatments has significantly stronger positive effect on 
net-of-industry-trend growth in profitability and wage arrears (Table 8). The difference in 
effects of the share of preferential treatments on other performance indicators for firms 
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not controlled and controlled by oligarchs is also consistently negative but statistically 
insignificant. The magnitude of the results suggests that a 10% increase in the average 
share of preferential treatments received by firms that belong to federal oligarchs leads to 
growth in profitability of 5.4%, in sales of 3.1%, in arrears to suppliers and wage arrears 
of 2.7%, and in tax arrears of 3.3%. These growth numbers are higher for federal 
oligarchs than for the average firm in the sample by 4.8, 2.4 (insignificant), 2.8, 2.4, and 
3.2 percentage points, respectively. As one would expect, the same results (albeit with 
smaller significance) are received for firms in groups that engaged in loans-for-shares 
(see appendix). If we make a very strong assumption that preferential treatment 
concentration is exogenous in this set up, the result about federal oligarchs is consistent 
with the story that they make better use of preferential treatments given to them 
compared to other controlling owners: they gain more in terms of performance boost and 
in terms of gaining bargaining power. In other words, they are more experienced captors 
than other firms. 
In contrast, when regional-level private owner has ultimate control, we do not find 
any effect of preferential treatments on performance (the coefficients of preferential 
treatment shares are essentially zeros and are statistically insignificant). Thus, it either is 
the case that preferential treatments are given to some in regional enterprises in order to 
bail them out which would bias our coefficients downwards or it could be the case that 
regional governments just have better bargaining power in relationships with regional 
enterprises that are regionally controlled compared to regional enterprises that are 
controlled by federal oligarchs. As discussed above, we cannot distinguish between the 
two explanations here. All the differences in effects of preferential treatment share for 
regional private owners and other firms are insignificant (see appendix). There are also 
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no significant results for effects of preferential treatments given to firms controlled by the 
federal government.  
When the controlling owner is regional government, the share of preferential 
treatments has significantly smaller than average effect on the net of industry trend 
growth in employment of 7.7 percentage points and wage arrears of 8.3 percentage points 
(Table 9). The difference in effects of the share of preferential treatments on net-of-
industry-trend growth in profitability, sales, assets, arrears to suppliers and to the 
government for firms not controlled by the regional government and firms controlled by 
the regional government is also negative but statistically insignificant. The fact that firms 
controlled by regional governments have slower growth of wage arrears is not surprising 
because wage arrears are politically costly to the regional governments. A more puzzling 
is the fact that regional enterprises do not use preferential treatment to hire more workers 
which would also have been consistent with governments’ political incentives (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994). One possible explanation for this is reversed causality:  preferential 
treatments are given to regional firms when they experience relative decrease in 
employment growth. 
When the controlling owner is a foreign investor, the share of preferential 
treatments has significantly smaller than the average effect on the net-of-industry-trend 
growth in wage arrears (see appendix). Overall, preferential treatments given to foreign 
firms do not have any significant or consistent effect on their performance. This could 
mean that preferential treatments given to foreign firms to attract FDI to the region do not 
really make much difference. The only significant effect is that the net effect of 
preferential treatments on wage arrears is negative and significant. It could be the case 
that regional governments bargain with foreign firms to reduce wage arrears in exchange 
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for preferential treatment (and regional government’s bargaining power is relatively 
strong). Thus, preferential treatments given to foreign firms do not mean much for these 
firms. There is insufficient number of observations to study how preferential treatments 
affect firms with dispersed ownership. 
Overall, one can note that the effects observed are statistically pretty weak. There 
could be two purely technical reasons for that: a small sample and absence of appropriate 
instruments.  
V. How is the effect of regional capture on non-captors affected by type of captor’s 
owner? 
First, we summarize how capture by different types of controlling owners is 
distributed across Russia’s regions. We define a region in a particular year to be captured 
by a certain owner type if in this year at least 50% of preferential treatments are given to 
firms controlled by the owners that are of this type. Further, we define a region to be 
captured in 1996-2000 by a certain owner type if it was captured by this owner type for at 
least two of the five years. Three regions were captured by two different types for 2 years 
during the period: Tatarstan republic, Vologda oblast, Orenburg oblast. Thus, we 
consider these regions to be captured by both types of owners. Table 11 presents the lists 
of captured regions by the type of captor. 
Second, we analyze differences in effect of regional capture on non-captor firms 
by type of captor’s controlling owner. In order to do this, we use the following basic OLS 
between effects specification:  
fftf
f
fffff yCaptorDummynContrPTCContrPTCCaptorDummyContrPTCy εαααα +++−•+= ∑ 04321 _)/__(__ . 
 (3) 
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Thus, we regress net-of-mean-industry performance characteristics of firms on the 
variable that reflects the scale of institutional subversion by a particular type of owner 
( ) and its interaction with the dummy that indicates firms-captors 
( ).
ContrPTC _
CaptorDummy _ 6  is equal to the regional preferential treatment 
concentration if firms with the particular type of controlling owner receive at least 50% 
of preferential treatments or if the region is not subverted by any firms, i.e., there are no 
preferential treatments in the region or their equal number given out to the five largest 
recipients of preferential treatments.
ContrPTC _
7 equals one if a firm is a recipient of 
preferential treatments. Here we control for the direct effect of preferential treatments on 
performance and the initial performance. Thus, coefficients should be interpreted in the 
following way: α
CaptorDummy _
1 is the effect of regional institutional subversion by a particular type of 
controlling owner on performance of firms that do not receive preferential treatments; α2 
is the difference in the effects of capture by a particular type of owner on captors and 
non-captors; and α3 is the effect of receiving preferential treatment evaluated at the mean 
value institutional subversion. The full set of regression results is presented in Table A2 
in Appendix.
The results are as follows: 
Institutional subversion by federal oligarchs has strong negative significant effect 
on all indicators of net-of-industry-trend performance of non-captor firms in the region 
(see Table 11): it significantly reduces growth in productivity, profitability, sales, 
employment, and regional market shares of non-captor firms. The economic significance 
of these results is as follows: a 10% increase in preferential treatment concentration in 
                                                 
6 The across-firms average preferential treatment concentration is subtracted from the regional preferential 
treatment concentration for a particular firm to make interpretation of coefficient α3 easier. 
7 Summary statistics for this variable are given in Table A3 in Appendix. 
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regions captured by federal oligarchs leads to a decrease in non-captor firms productivity 
of 3.5%; profitability of 6.7%; sales of 6.8%, and employment of 3.8%, and a 0.8 
percentage points decrease in their regional market share. The results are very similar for 
members of groups that were engaged in loans-for-shares privatization (see Table 12). A 
10% increase in preferential treatment concentration in regions captured by loans-for-
shares groups leads to a 3.2% decrease in productivity, 8.8% decrease in profitability, 
8.3% decrease in sales, and 0.4 percentage points decrease in regional market share of 
non-captor firms. Just as with capture by federal oligarchs, when preferential treatments 
are given to foreign firms, preferential treatment concentration has consistently negative 
but significant only for profitability effect on firms that do not receive preferential 
treatment.8
In contrast to capture by federal oligarchs, institutional subversion by regional 
private owners does not have a significant or systematic negative effect on other regional 
firms (all coefficients are insignificant and five out of seven are positive). If preferential 
treatments are given to firms that are controlled by regional governments, preferential 
treatment concentration also does not have a statistically significant effect on regional 
governments, but all coefficients are consistently positive. Effect of capture by firms 
controlled by the federal government is insignificant and there is no consistent pattern in 
the coefficients. 
Even though, there are only few statistically significant results, the overall picture 
is quite striking.  The strong negative effect of capture when captors are the federal 
oligarchs, groups engaged in loans for shares, or foreign investors makes perfect sense 
                                                 
8 Note that federal private oligarchs have the largest number of observations. It is possible, that we just 
have insufficient number of observations to get significance for preferential treatment concentration of 
preferential treatments received by foreign investors. 
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because they do not internalize externalities from capture on other firms in the region 
(unlike the regional government). Private regional controlling owners turn out to be more 
benign than federal oligarchs or foreign investors: capture by regional private owners 
does not have a negative significant effect on other regional firms. This is consistent with 
the story that regional private firms have smaller bargaining power vis-à-vis regional 
authorities that internalize this externality of regulatory policies. (Preferential treatments 
given to state regional firms have, if any, positive effect on other regional firms.) Thus, 
the key differences between the effects of capture by the type of captor’s controlling 
owner are not in the distinction between state vs. private ownership and control, but in 
the distinction between federal vs. regional interests. Our results once again confirm the 
importance of the structure of federalism relations to functioning of Russian economy. 
Due to insufficient number of observation we are unable to draw inference about the 
effect of capture by firms that have dispersed ownership. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper investigated how regional capture is affected by the identity of the 
controlling owner. The main point that comes out of our analysis is that the most 
effective and the least benign captors are the firms that are members of groups that have 
representation in more than two regions and firms belonging to groups that engaged in 
loans-for-shares privatization. Although, federal oligarchs receive preferential treatments 
less often than other firms (the opposite is true for loans-for-shares groups), preferential 
treatments given to these firms bring them higher than average benefits in terms of 
performance boost and acquisition of bargaining power vis-à-vis employees, suppliers, 
and government. When federal oligarchs receive disproportionate number of regional 
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preferential treatments, other firms in the region suffer more from capture than when 
capture is carried out by other firms. Firms that controlled by private agents with 
economic interests that do not span on more than two regions (although are more likely to 
get treated preferentially by the regional legislature) do not have such a strong effect of 
preferential treatments on either their own performance or performance of other regional 
firms.  
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Table 1. Regional distribution of firms in the sample 
Region name 
Number 
of firms  Region name 
Number 
of firms 
Sverdlovsk oblast 9  Bashkortostan rep. 5 
Moscow city 9  Karelia republic 5 
Khabarovsk krai 8  Tatarstan republic 5 
Kaliningrad oblast 8  Udmurtia Republic 5 
Orenburg oblast 8  Stavropol krai 5 
Perm oblast 8  Kamchatka oblast 5 
Rostov oblast 8  Sakhalin oblast 5 
Samara oblast 8  Ulyanovsk oblast 5 
Tyumen oblast 8  Chelyabinsk oblast 5 
Yaroslavl oblast 8  Sakha republic 4 
Irkutsk oblast 7  Krasnodar krai 4 
St. Petersburg city 7  Krasnoyarsk krai 4 
Primorskii krai 6  Amur oblast 4 
Arkhangelsk oblast 6  Vologda oblast 4 
Belgorod oblast 6  Kirov oblast 4 
Bryansk oblast 6  Kursk oblast 4 
Volgograd oblast 6  Lipetsk oblast 4 
Kemerovo oblast 6  Novgorod oblast 4 
Moskow oblast 6  Penza oblast 4 
Murmansk oblast 6  Tver oblast 4 
N. Novgorod oblast 6    
Omsk oblast 6    
Tomsk oblast 6  The other 23 regions 44 
Tula oblast 6    
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Table 2. Distribution of firms in the sample by industry 
Industry # of firms  Industry # of firms 
Energy 44  Tobacco 7 
Oil 42  Gas 6 
Ferrous met. 19  Pipes 5 
Auto 18  Beer 4 
Coal 14  Meat 4 
Fish 14  Milk 4 
Pulp 13  Mill 4 
P. Chemicals 12  Jewelry 3 
Aluminum 11  Non-alcohol dr. 3 
Machinery 11  Cable 3 
Confectionary 10  Timber 3 
Nonferrous met. 10  Trade energy 2 
Pharmaceuticals 8  Vodka 2 
Tire 8  Furniture 2 
Ore 7  Polygraph 1 
Rubber 7      
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Table 3. Preferential treatments and the size of groups   
Number of firms 
in a group 
Number of 
firms 
Average number of 
preferential treatments 
Average share of 
preferential treatments 
1-5 firms 104 0.18* 0.12 
6-24 firms 91 0.27 0.13 
25 firms and more 96 0.26 0.15* 
Whole sample 301 0.24 0.14 
Note: The table reports unconditional means. * denotes significant difference from other 
two groups 
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Table 4. Preferential treatments given to firms that do and do not have control over 
other firms 
  Number of firms 
Average share of 
preferential 
treatments 
Standard 
errors 
Ultimate controlling owner of a group 6 0.16 0.04 
Other firms 285 0.13 0.01 
Controlling owner of a firm 44 0.17** 0.01 
Other firms 248 0.13  0.01 
Note: The table reports unconditional means.  ** denotes significant difference 
from other firms at 5% level 
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Table 5.  Preferential treatments by the type of controlling owner 
 Owner type 
Number 
of firms
Average 
number of 
preferential 
treatments 
Average 
share of 
preferential 
treatments 
Average 
employment 
of a firm 
Average 
number of 
firms in 
group* 
 Regional government 9 0.38 0.16 14278 30 
 Foreign investor 22 0.34 0.16 2372 12 
 Federal government 63 0.32 0.15 6154 44 
 Federal private oligarch 129 0.19 0.12 7620 20 
 Regional private owner 67 0.22 0.13 5177 3 
 Dispersed ownership 11 0.08 0.12 4198 0 
Note: The table reports unconditional means.  
* The average number of firms in groups is calculated from the full sample of firms that 
have ownership data. The rest of the statistics are given for the sub-sample of firms used 
in analysis (i.e., that have both ownership and preferential treatments data). 
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Table 6.  Preferential treatments and “loans-for-shares” oligarchs  
  Number of firms 
Average share of 
preferential 
treatments 
Standard 
errors 
Firms in groups that 
engaged in loans for shares 65  0.17** 0.01 
Other 236 0.13  0.01 
Note: The table reports unconditional means. ** denotes significant difference at 5% 
level 
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Table 7. Who gets treated preferentially? (OLS, Between effects) 
 Share of preferential treatments 
0.12      Ultimate controlling owner of a group 
[0.06]**     
 0.04    Controlling owner of a firm 
 [0.02]*    
  0.04   Dummy – Regional private owner 
  [0.03]*   
  0.08   Dummy – Foreign owner  
  [0.03]**   
  0.07   Dummy – Dispersed ownership 
  [0.05]   
   -0.03  Dummy – Federal private oligarch 
   [0.02]**  
Dummy – Loans for shares     0.03 
     [0.02]* 
 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 Log (number of firms in group) 
 [0.01]* [0.01]** [0.01]* [0.01] 
0.02  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Log (initial employment) 
[0.01]*** [0.01]** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]** 
Constant -0.05 0.01 -0.07 0 0.03  
 [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] 
Observations 1308  1374 1374 1374 1374  
Number of firms 289  290 290 290 290  
R-squared 0.05  0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04  
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 8. Effect of the share of preferential treatments on firms controlled by federal oligarchs (OLS, Between effects) 
  
Profitabi-
lity  Sales
Employ-
ment 
Wage 
arrears 
Arrears to 
suppliers 
Arrears to 
budget 
D_NON_fed. oligarch *PTS -3.44 -2.4 -0.64 -2.02 -1.7 -2.3 
(effect of NON-fed. oligarch – effect of 
fed. oligarch) 
 
[1.85]*      
      
      
      
     
      
     
      
      
      
    
      
       
      
[1.50] [0.99] [1.03]* [0.87]* [1.14]**
PTS 3.86 2.23 0.66 1.91 1.89 2.37
(effect of fed. oligarch)  [1.50]** [1.22]* [0.83] [0.82]** [0.70]*** [0.90]***
-0.09 -0.48 -0.32 0.08 0.18 -0.01
D_fed. oligarch [0.21] [0.17]*** [0.12]*** [0.12] [0.10]* [0.14]
0.35 0.09 0.47 0.73 0.62 0.58
Initial level of depend variable [0.05]*** [0.05]* [0.04]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]***
0.11 -0.29 0.57 0.01 0.06 0.11
Preferential Treatments Concentration 
 
[0.69] [0.58] [0.39] [0.35] [0.29] [0.38]
Constant 4.04 0.43 -2.71 1.1 0.42 1.18
[0.73]*** [0.36]***[0.75] [0.30]*** [0.39] [0.34]***
 Observations 1260 1284 1298 914 915 911
Number of firms
 
284 284 288 276 276 276
R-squared 0.16 0.05 0.34 0.72 0.63 0.65
PTS from the adjacent regression 0.43 -0.17 0.02 -0.11 0.2 0.07 
(= effect of NON_fed. Olig.) [1.08]      [0.88] [0.54] [0.63] [0.54] [0.70]
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 9. Effect of preferential treatment share on firms controlled by regional government (OLS, Between effects) 
 
Profitabil
ity  Sales
Fixed 
Assets 
Employm
ent 
Wage 
arrears 
Arrears to 
suppliers 
Arrears to 
budget 
D_NON_reg.govern. *PTS        5.36 5.38 2.66 5.51 5.9 3.01 4.99
(effect of NON-reg. government – effect 
of reg. government) 
[4.74]       
        
      
       
        
       
 
      
       
       
  
        
        
       
        
[4.06] [3.26] [2.73]** [2.78]** [2.39] [3.09]
PTS -3.55 -4.43 -1.71 -5.03 -5.08 -2.11 -3.9
(effect of reg. government)  [4.66] [3.99] [3.21] [2.69]* [2.74]* [2.35] [3.04]
0 0.22 0.21 -0.01 0.07 0.15 -0.06
D_reg. government [0.60] [0.53] [0.40] [0.34] [0.35] [0.30] [0.39]
0.36 0.06 0.57 0.44 0.73 0.62 0.57
Initial level of depend variable [0.05]*** [0.05] [0.03]***
 
 [0.04]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]***
-0.11 -0.54 0.02 0.43 -0.14 -0.04 -0.02
Preferential Treatments Concentration 
 
[0.69] [0.59] [0.47] [0.39] [0.35] [0.29] [0.38]
Constant 5.03 1.56 0.39 -1.83 2.11 1.09 2.13
[0.97]*** [0.94]* [0.52]***[0.66] [0.48]*** [0.52]** [0.53]***
Observations 1260 1284 1266 1298 914 915 911
Number of firms
 
284 284 284 288 276 276 276
R-squared 0.16 0.02 0.53 0.33 0.72 0.62 0.65
PTS from the adjacent regression 1.81 0.96 0.95 0.48 0.82 0.91 1.09
(= effect of NON_reg. government) [0.90]**       [0.74] [0.54]* [0.46] [0.51] [0.44]** [0.56]*
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 10. Captured regions (1996-2000) 
Federal government: Sakha republic; Belgorod oblast; Vologda oblast (1998, 1999); Kurgan oblast; Nizhny 
Novgorod oblast; Omsk oblast 
Regional government: Bashkortostan republic; Tatarstan republic (1997, 1999, 2000); Moscow city 
Regional private owner: Mordovia republic; Tatarstan republic (1996, 1998, 2000); Kaliningrad oblast; Moskow 
oblast; Perm oblast;  Rostov oblast; Tula oblast; Tyumen oblast; Chelyabinsk oblast 
Federal private oligarch: Karelia republic; Krasnoyarsk krai; Primorskii krai;  Vologda oblast (1996, 1998, 2000); 
Lipetsk oblast;  Orenburg oblast (1998, 1999); Sverdlovsk oblast 
Foreign investor: Udmurtia Republic; Orenburg oblast  (1996, 1997, 1999); Sarartov oblast 
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Table 11. Effect of federal oligarchs’ capture on non-captor firms (OLS, Between effects) 
  
Produc-
tivity 
Profitabi-
lity  Sales
Fixed 
Assets 
Employ-
ment 
Regional 
Market 
Share 
PTC_F.O.       -1.6 -3.06 -3.1 -0.33 -1.72 -0.38
(effect of capture by fed. 
oligarch on non-captors) 
 
[0.80]**      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
    
       
       
      
[1.61]* [1.46]** [0.91] [0.68]** [0.15]**
D_PTS *PTC_F.O. 0.88 5.23 4.17 1.72 1.16 0.53
(difference in effects on captors 
and non-captors) 
 
[1.25] [2.52]** [2.26]* [1.41] [1.07] [0.24]**
D_PTS
 
0.07 -1.94 -1.25 0.1 0.12 -0.1
[0.44] [0.89]** [0.80] [0.50] [0.38] [0.08]
0.08 0.5 0.38 0.52 0.49 0.75
Initial level of depend variable
 
[0.06] [0.08]*** [0.08]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]***
Constant 0.02 3.43 6.77 0.9 -2.25 0.23
[0.39] [1.14]***[1.02]*** [0.56] [0.37]*** [0.04]***
Observations 472 458 459 464 473 501
Number of firms
 
211 201 202 206 212 218
R-squared 0.03 0.2 0.12 0.48 0.39 0.61
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 12. Effect of firms in loans-for-shares groups capture on non-captor firms (OLS, Between effects) 
  
Produc-
tivity 
Profitabi-
lity  Sales
Fixed 
Assets 
Employm
ent 
Regional 
Market 
Share 
PTC_L. for S.       -1.45 -3.95 -3.78 -1.03 -0.74 -0.2
(effect of capture by loans for 
share on non-captors) 
[0.65]**      
      
       
    
      
      
      
    
       
       
      
[1.29]*** [1.13]*** [0.71] [0.53] [0.12]*
D_PTS *PTC_L. for S. 0.89 4.91 4.54 1.52 0.44 0.41 
(difference in effects on captors 
and non-captors) 
[1.04] [2.07]** [1.81]** [1.16] [0.88] [0.20]**
D_PTS -0.14 -1.57 -1.34 0.04 0.24 -0.1
[0.41] [0.72]*[0.82]* [0.46] [0.35] [0.08]
0.15 0.53 0.43 0.56 0.49 0.74
Initial level of depend variable
 
[0.06]** [0.08]*** [0.08]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]***
Constant -0.42 3.11 6.18 0.52 -2.57 0.19
[0.36] [1.09]***[0.96]*** [0.54] [0.36]*** [0.04]***
Observations 464 450 451 456 465 491
Number of firms
 
217 207 208 212 218 224
R-squared 0.04 0.21 0.15 0.5 0.4 0.58
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1. Average number of preferential treatments per firm in the sample 
Average number of preferential treatments
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Appendix 
Table A2. The table presents coefficients α1 and α2 (along with robust SEs) from the full set of regressions (2) 
Regression for:  
Producti-
vity 
Profitabi-
lity Sales 
Fixed 
Assets 
Employ-
ment 
Wage 
arrears 
Arrears to 
suppliers 
Arrears 
to budget
Regional 
Market 
Share 
National 
Market 
share 
Federal Private Oligarchs           
D_NON_fed. oligarch *PTS -0.3 -3.44 -2.4 -1.69       
         
          
-0.64 -2.02 -1.7 -2.3 -0.25 -0.01
(difference of effects) 
 
[1.08] [1.85]* [1.50] [1.20] [0.99] [1.03]* [0.87]* [1.14]** [0.21] [0.02]
PTS -0.08 3.86 2.23 2.14 0.66 1.91 1.89 2.37 0.3 0
(effect of fed. oligarch)  [0.87] [1.50]** [1.22]* [1.02]** [0.83] [0.82]** [0.70]*** [0.90]** [0.17]* [0.02] 
PTS from the adjacent regression -0.38 0.43 -0.17 0.45 0.02 -0.11 0.2 0.07 0.05 -0.01 
(= effect of NON_fed. oligarch) [0.64]          
          
[1.08] [0.88] [0.63] [0.54] [0.63] [0.54] [0.70] [0.12] [0.01]
 Regional Private Owners 
D_NON_reg. oligarch *PTS -0.63 1.27 2.2 0.28 0.37 1.35 0.84 1.73 0.27 0.01 
(difference of effects) 
 
[1.24]          
      
[2.16] [1.74] [1.14] [0.95] [1.37] [1.18] [1.52] [0.24] [0.02]
PTS 0.35 -0.890.72  0.070.69 -0.58 0.09 -0.5 -0.08 -0.01
(effect of reg. oligarch)  [1.09] [1.93] [1.53] [0.92] [0.77] [1.27] [1.09] [1.40] [0.22] [0.02] 
PTS from the adjacent regression -0.28 2 1.31 0.97 0.44 0.78 0.93 1.23 0.19 0 
(= effect of NON_reg. oligarch) [0.58]        
          
[0.97]** [0.82] [0.67] [0.56] [0.55] [0.47]** [0.61]** [0.11]* [0.01]
 Federal Government 
D_NON_fed.govern.*PTS           
          
          
0.82 0.06 -0.73 0.96 -0.48 -1.17 0.17 0.23 0.15 0
(difference of effects) 
 
[1.20] [2.01] [1.65] [1.28] [1.08] [1.10] [0.93] [1.22] [0.21] [0.02]
PTS -0.79 1.68 1.28 0.15 0.66 1.38 0.77 0.73 0.01 0
(effect of fed. government)  [1.03] [1.72] [1.41] [1.13] [0.96] [0.92] [0.78] [1.02] [0.18] [0.02] 
PTS from the adjacent regression 0.03 1.73 0.55 1.1 0.18 0.22 0.94 0.95 0.15 0 
(= effect of NON_fed. gov.) [0.61]          [1.02]* [0.85] [0.60]* [0.51] [0.60] [0.51]* [0.67] [0.11] [0.01]
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Table A1 (Continued.) 
 Regression for:  
Producti-
vity 
Profitabi-
lity Sales 
Fixed 
Assets 
Employ-
ment 
Wage 
arrears 
Arrears 
to 
suppliers
Arrears 
to budget
Regional 
Market 
Share 
National 
Market 
share 
Regional Government           
D_NON_reg.govern. *PTS           
         
          
          
          
-1.33 5.36 5.38 2.66 5.51 5.9 3.01 4.99 0.47 0.01
(difference of effects) 
 
[2.90] [4.74] [4.06] [3.26] [2.73]** [2.78]** [2.39] [3.09] [0.43] [0.04]
PTS 1.09 -3.55 -4.43 -1.71 -5.03 -5.08 -2.11 -3.9 -0.31 -0.01
(effect of reg. gev)  [2.85] [4.66] [3.99] [3.21] [2.69]* [2.74]* [2.35] [3.04] [0.42] [0.04]
PTS from the adjacent 
regression -0.24 1.81 0.96 0.95 0.48 0.82 0.91 1.09 0.17 0
(= effect of NON_reg. gov.) [0.53]          
          
[0.90]** [0.74] [0.54]* [0.46] [0.51] [0.44]** [0.56]* [0.10]* [0.01]
Foreign investors 
D_NON_foreign *PTS 0.69          
         
          
            
          
1.97 2.67 1.65 1.78 4.23 0.46 -0.35 -0.05 0
(difference of effects) 
 
[1.63] [2.60] [2.27] [1.69] [1.50] [1.62]*** [1.39] [1.81] [0.31] [0.03]
PTS -0.9 -0.03 -1.69 -0.68 -1.44 -3.11 0.32 1.3 0.19 0
(effect of foreign. Investor) [1.52] [2.41] [2.13] [1.60] [1.43] [1.52]** [1.31] [1.70] [0.29] [0.03]
PTS from the adjacent 
regression -0.21 1.94 0.98 0.97 0.34 1.12 0.78 0.96 0.13 0
(= effect of NON_foreig. inv) [0.55]          
          
[0.96]** [0.77] [0.57]* [0.47] [0.53]** [0.46]* [0.59] [0.10] [0.01]
 Loans for shares 
D_NON_L_for_S*PTS           
           
          
            
          
0.82 0.06 -0.73 0.96 -0.48 -1.17 0.17 0.23 0.15 0
(difference of effects)
 
[1.20] [2.01] [1.65] [1.28] [1.08] [1.10] [0.93] [1.22] [0.21] [0.02]
PTS -0.79 1.68 1.28 0.15 0.66 1.38 0.77 0.73 0.01 0
(effect of L for S) [1.03] [1.72] [1.41] [1.13] [0.96] [0.92] [0.78] [1.02] [0.18] [0.02]
PTS from the adjacent 
regression 0.03 1.73 0.55 1.1 0.18 0.22 0.94 0.95 0.15 0
(= effect of NON_L for S)           [0.61] [1.02]* [0.85] [0.60]* [0.51] [0.60] [0.51]* [0.67] [0.11] [0.01]
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Table A2. The table presents coefficients α1 and α2 (along with robust SEs) from the full set of regressions (3) 
Regression for:  
Productivity Profitability  Sales Fixed Assets Employment
Regional 
market share
National 
market share
Federal Private Oligarchs        
       -1.6 -3.06 -3.1 -0.33 -1.72 -0.38 -0.01PTC_Federal_Oligarch  (effect of 
capture by fed. oligarch on non-captors) [0.80]**       
       
       
       
[1.61]* [1.46]** [0.91] [0.68]** [0.15]** [0.01]
0.88 5.23 4.17 1.72 1.16 0.53 0.05D_PTS * Federal_Oligarch  (difference 
in effects on captors and non-captors) [1.25] [2.52]** [2.26]* [1.41] [1.07] [0.24]** [0.02]**
 Regional Private Owners 
0.77       
       
       
       
       
0.84 0.5 0.04 -0.74 -0.1 0.01PTC_Regional_Oligarch  (effect of 
capture by reg. oligarch on non-captors) [0.85] [1.82] [1.59] [1.01] [0.73] [0.16] [0.01]
0.61 1.49 0.4 0.93 0.49 0.13 -0.01D_PTS * Regional_Oligarch  
(difference in effects on captors and 
non-captors) 
[1.69] [3.53] [3.08] [1.55] [1.16] [0.31] [0.03]
 Foreign investors 
-3.99       
       
       
       
-10.84 -8.52 -2.92 -0.12 -0.49 -0.03PTC_Foreign  (effect of capture by 
foreign investor on non-captors) [2.93] [5.96]* [5.22] [3.22] [2.51] [0.56] [0.05]
4.65 10.86 7.23 3.59 0.56 0.72 0.04D_PTS *PTC_Foreign  (difference in 
effects on captors and non-captors) [3.25] [6.63] [5.81] [3.58] [2.79] [0.64]   [0.05]
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Table A2. (Continued.) 
Federal Government Productivity Profitability  Sales Fixed Assets Employment
Regional 
market share
National 
market share
-0.7       
       
       
       
       
-2.79 -2.1 -0.84 0.88 0.26 0.02PTC_Fed.Gov.  (effect of capture by 
fed. government on non-captors) [1.21] [2.20] [2.08] [1.17] [0.89] [0.20] [0.02]
-0.32 4.01 2.35 0.48 -0.42 0.08 -0.02
D_PTS *PTC_ Fed.Gov.  (difference in 
effects on captors and non-captors) 
[1.57] [2.85] [2.69] [1.51] [1.15] [0.26] [0.02]
 Regional government 
1.71       
       
       
       
       
0.23 1.23 1.92 0.18 0.14 0.1
PTC_Reg.Gov.  (effect of capture by 
reg. government on non-captors) 
[1.57] [3.22] [2.93] [1.75] [1.38] [0.28] [0.02]***
-1.62 0.14 -1.59 -2.06 -1.95 -0.36 -0.13D_PTS *PTC_ Reg.Gov.  (difference in 
effects on captors and non-captors) [2.49] [5.08] [5.63] [2.76] [2.19] [0.62] [0.05]**
 Loans for shares 
-1.45       
       
       
       
-3.95 -3.78 -1.03 -0.74 -0.2 -0.01PTC_L. for S.  (effect of capture by 
loans for shares on non-captors) [0.65]** [1.29]*** [1.13]*** [0.71] [0.53] [0.12]* [0.01]
0.89 4.91 4.54 1.52 0.44 0.41 0.04D_PTS *PTC_L. for S.  (difference in 
effects on captors and non-captors) [1.04] [2.07]** [1.81]** [1.16] [0.88] [0.20]** [0.02]**
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Table A3. Summary statistics for institutional subversion measure by different controlling owner type 
   Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PTC_ reg. oligarch 1381 0.23 0.14 0.2 1 
PTC_ loans for shares 1398 0.23 0.13 0.2 1 
PTC_ fed. government 1346 0.22 0.11 0.2 1 
PTC_ reg. government 1318 0.21 0.06 0.2 1 
PTC_ fed. oligarch 1449 0.25 0.17 0.2 1 
PTC_foreign investor      1316 0.21 0.06 0.2 1
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